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Abstract. One of the key issues at metropolitan level is the provision of public services
and this paper highlights the importance of understanding the governance of public services
in the context of increasing urbanization and decentralization. This paper provides a
comparative analysis on metropolitan governance in Latin America by analysing specific
case studies. The objective is to identify how the governance setting in metropolitan
areas shapes the process and the results of providing public services to wider population.
We examine metropolitan governance by employing a 3x3x3 model as a framework for
addressing key issues about urban services delivery. Bogota, Lima and Mexico City are
the metropolitan areas selected. Secondly, we focus on three sectors: transport, solid
waste collection and water. Finally, the analysis focuses in three aspects of governance:
coordination, financial sustainability and coverage and quality. The data collection process
involved field research in Bogota, Lima and Mexico City.
1 Introduction
The urban transition in Latin America throughout the twentieth century was relatively
rapid, and the move to urban living continues at an accelerated pace in several countries in
the region. One of the most striking recent features of urbanization in Latin America has
been the emergence of metropolitan areas: cities that have surpassed the limits of their
immediate outermost periphery, expanding beyond their administrative boundaries. In
some cases, urbanization and urban expansion have led to the emergence of megacities that
are national centers of economic or political power, such as Sao Paulo and Mexico City.
Metropolitan areas face significant economic, social, political and environmental challenges
that extend beyond the borders of local governments, including different administrative
divisions across the territory. The provision of public services has become one of the most
critical and pressing metropolitan concerns. While the theory and praxis of providing
services in metropolitan areas have been subjects of great interest in advanced countries,
they have been largely downplayed in low- and middle-income countries (Bahl 2013).
Furthermore, some normative discussions about metropolitan areas in Latin America have
focused on ideal government models, yet there is very little in the existing literature on the
problems of providing public services at the metropolitan level. This paper highlights the
importance of knowing and understanding how public services are provided in the context
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of increasing metropolitanization and decentralization due to the hypothesized negative
impact of politico-administrative fragmentation. According to some studies, fragmentation
translates into weak governance, creating substantial difficulties in providing services.
Despite this predominant assumption, the body of knowledge on the key governance
challenges in metropolitan areas, especially in less developed countries, is not robust and
lacks empirical work and comparative studies. This study contributes to the literature by
implementing a comparative analysis of public service provision in metropolitan areas in
Latin America.
Our general research question refers to the characteristics and outcomes of governance
for delivering public services in metropolitan areas, and how, in practice, governance
schemes accommodate different contexts. More specifically, the paper deals with the
following questions: What are the underlying characteristics of metropolitan governance
and organization in Latin American countries? How do metropolitan areas organize the
provision of public services? What is the performance of services delivery in terms of
financial sustainability, coverage and quality? How do governance and outcomes vary
across different services and metropolitan areas?
We employed a 3x3x3 model of comparative analysis with three metropolitan areas
(Bogota, Lima, and Mexico City), three services (public transport, solid waste collection,
and piped water), and three aspects of governance (coverage and quality, financial
sustainability, and coordination). Analyzing the provision of public services in different
metropolitan areas in the Latin American region, we discuss how variation in metropolitan
organization translates into specific outcomes across the selected cases. A variety of
governance structures are identified, a few of which attempt to reverse some of the negative
effects of jurisdictional fragmentation. The collected data includes secondary sources
(statistics, reports, and documents), and field research in Bogota, Lima, and Mexico City,
where a number of focus groups, interviews and technical visits took place. The paper
includes a synthetic literature review, a description of the methodological design, an
overview of the metropolitan organization and structures in the three selected areas, the
research results and discussion. We conclude with a number of final remarks that can be
useful for metropolitan level public policies.
2 Metropolitan Governance and Provision of Local Public Services
Metropolitan areas are huge and complex urban areas whose functional scope extends
beyond their jurisdictional boundaries. There is commonly political-administrative
fragmentation, and policy implementation resides with individual autonomous local
authorities. This is a challenge for urban planning, management and policy design.
Because of their scale, complexity and fixed government structures, metropolitan areas
conduct their planning and policy tasks in difficult environments. Metropolitan areas must
provide services and infrastructure in sophisticated ways because the structure of land use
is more diverse, the magnitude and complexity of expenditure is much greater, and the
size and concentration of the population is larger than in other urban areas (Slack 2007).
One of the key areas of public action at the metropolitan level is the provision of services.
As metropolitan areas extend to multiple local jurisdictions, there is an increasing need
to expand service provision to fulfill the population’s social needs. Inadequate provision
of basic services translates into significant gaps between demand for and supply of urban
services. Large intra-urban disparities can develop. Given the intricacy of metropolitan
areas, governance plays an important role in the effective delivery of services. Governance
defines the quantity and quality of services provided, their efficiency, and their equitable
cost sharing (Jones et al. 2014, Slack 2007, Bird, Slack 2007).
The long-standing debate on how to govern and manage metropolitan areas, whether
via decentralized or consolidated structures, has been framed mostly in the theoretical
discussion around government decentralization and its consequences for efficiency and
equity (Bird, Slack 2007, p. 730). According to the subsidiarity principle, subnational
levels of government achieve greater welfare gains by adjusting the provision of public
goods and services to citizens’ preferences and local costs (Oates 1997). Decentralization
favors accountability, and horizontal competition triggers a better supply of public
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goods (Tiebout 1956). On the other hand, consolidation facilitates the exploitation of
economies of scale, the management of externalities, and the quest for equity (Treisman
2000). Consolidation can also contribute to minimizing the dangers of elite capture and
corruption, especially in developing countries (Prud’homme 1995).
Echoing the principles above, the Public Choice School argues that decentralized
metropolitan governments spur effective and efficient service delivery by promoting
competition (Yaro, Ronderos 2011), whereas Regionalism and New Consolidationist
supporters argue in favor of metropolitan governments (Lowery 2000). In practice a
variety of metropolitan structures have been implemented, based either on the fragmented
version or on different forms of government consolidation. Slack (2007) and Bird, Slack
(2007), for instance, identify the one-tier fragmented model, the single-tier consolidated
model, the two-tier model, and the one-tier model with voluntary cooperation.
According to Storper (2014), fragmentation is an inevitable condition in metropolitan
areas, and the regulation of the resulting interdependent relations in the absence of
an overarching political authority is highly problematic. The enduring gaps between
functional and administrative boundaries mean that there will always be governance
problems at hand, and neither complete consolidation nor fragmentation is likely to resolve
these fundamental metropolitan issues. Rather than a single government, metropolitan
areas require structures of governance that are sufficiently open to allow for diverse
solutions in an environment characterized by variable conditions (Parks, Oakerson 1989).
Following Parks, Oakerson (1989), jurisdictionally fragmented metropolitan areas are
complexly organized. However, organizational diversity and complexity do not necessarily
imply institutional failure and can in fact lead to higher efficiency. By means of agreements
and associations, local governments, civil society, and the private sector acting together
in a coordinated manner can achieve acceptable governance structures (Feiock 2004).
Therefore, there is no single correct way to organize metropolitan areas, and no single
geography or organization of governance, and arrangements for service provision are place-
and time-specific (Bahl 2013, Slack 2007, Parks, Oakerson 1993, 1989). In the particular
case of public services, efficient scales and preferences can be multiple and heterogeneous,
and evolve over time (Slack 2007, Parks, Oakerson 1989). Public services also have diverse
production functions and financial and cost structures (Parks, Oakerson 1989).
The fundamental distinction between the provision and the production of public
services makes the case for organizational structures that allow for a more complete
depiction of metropolitan governance and its complexity. Local governments are provision
units that use a variety of alternative production arrangements: direct production, private
contracting, coordinated or joint production, or franchising. Therefore, metropolitan
areas comprise multiple provision units that are linked in numerous ways to a variety of
production units. This variety usually represents rational accommodations to diversity.
The choice of governance arrangements is contingent upon a multiplicity of environmental
factors, yet governance depends, above all, on the capacity to elaborate on, change and
enforce the rules within which provision and production occur (Parks, Oakerson 1989).
Governance structures can transcend municipal boundaries and allow problem solving,
rule making and efficiency on a metropolitan basis. However, when close voluntary
organization and cooperation are not achieved, metropolitan governance weakens (Parks,
Oakerson 1993). Accordingly, the different levels of governance (provision and production
arrangements and the sets of rules and institutions) are what matter (Figure 1).
3 Methodological Framework and Data Collection
As a methodological strategy for this research we employed a comparative case study
analysis implemented by means of a 3x3x3 model. The first 3 in the model refers to
the selected metropolises, the second indicates the number of services and the third
relates to specific aspects of governance (Figure 2). This approach is a useful starting
point for an international and comparative analysis of metropolitan governance in the
highly-urbanized countries of Latin America with its varying city sizes, metropolitan
structures, and outcomes.
The metropolitan areas of Bogota, Lima, and Mexico City are the subjects of this
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Parks, Oakerson (1993)
Figure 1: Metropolitan governance organization
Source: Authors’ elaboration
Figure 2: Components of the 3 x 3 x 3 model of analysis
analysis. All three metropolitan areas have undergone processes of rapid metropolization
which have engendered important challenges for the provision of public services and
infrastructure. They all belong to the Latin American region and have some cultural
background and colonial roots in common. The three metropolitan areas are capital cities
that have special political-administrative status. Even though their countries operate
under different political systems, with unitary governments in Colombia and Peru, and a
federal government in Mexico, they have undertaken important decentralization processes.
These metropolitan areas also offer the possibility of illustrating variability in governance
structures. In addition, they present different historical forms of metropolitan expansion
and institutionalization.
Although the number of public services provided in metropolitan areas is extensive,
we focus on three of the most critical sectors in the urban context that are generally
provided at the local level: transport, solid waste collection, and water. These sectors are
strategic in urban planning and affect the day-to-day life of the population. Moreover,
they denote the kinds of service that pose unique challenges in metropolitan environments
(Boex et al. 2013, Jones et al. 2014). Jones et al. (2014) suggest that governance plays an
important role in the effective delivery of services in urban areas through coordination
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mechanisms, finances, and technical operation. This analysis includes these three areas:
coordination and production arrangements; financial sustainability; and service coverage
and quality. Given the scope of this project, the analysis does not include elements such
as civil society participation, transparency, and accountability.
The data collection process included desktop and field work. Documental and secondary
statistical information from international, national and local sources was gathered. The
results and discussion in this paper also rely on the data collected during the fieldwork
period. In 2016, we conducted field research in the three selected cities and organized a final
seminar and a conference in Mexico City. The fieldwork included workshops, interviews
and technical visits. Nine workshops were organized: one for each sector (transportation,
water, and waste collection) in each city. The participants at these workshops were actors
or experts in the governance of public service provision: the academic sector, civil society,
local government and private suppliers. We located sources of potential participants
based on their location and willingness to participate. The workshops were designed as
small focus groups where participants reported on and discussed the situation and the
challenges to each public service that different actors perceived at the metropolitan level.
There was a number of guiding questions about the three categories of analysis, and we
allowed other issues to emerge (see the guiding questionnaire and participants in the
methodological appendix). The workshops lasted approximately two hours each, and took
place in small auditoriums.
Furthermore, twelve semi-structured interviews were carried out. The sample universe
was composed of local authorities such as municipal mayors or specific local officials (in
the urban services area), community leaders, and sector-specific managers or providers
who were unable to participate in the workshops but were relevant actors in some area
of urban public services. Although this was a small-scale interview project, it provided
enough scope for identifying and developing cross-case evidence rather than generalities.
We assessed the adequacy of the sample in terms not of size, but of the sample’s ability
to supply key information needed for the analysis.
Six technical visits to the metropolitan peripheries were incorporated as part of the
field research. Due to time and budget constraints the number of technical visits was
restricted. The criteria for choosing a location were access to some local informants,
a big and a small municipality outside the central city, and the presence of important
formal or informal housing development expansion. The assumption was that these
municipalities would experience emerging and persistent governance issues. Technical
visits involved observation, interviews and informal conversations with residents. The
results were presented and discussed at the final seminar.
Based on analysis of the transcripts and reports on the interviews, visits and workshops,
major issues were identified and reported. A contextual characterization of the governance
of each metropolitan area was developed. This was followed by an analysis based on the
different services (transport, solid waste collection and water). The comparative approach
allowed us to evaluate variations across metropolitan areas and services. This paper’s
size limit precludes a full in-depth analysis of each case; nonetheless, valuable findings
are discussed for an initial assessment of metropolitan governance.
4 Overview of Metropolitan Structures in Mexico City, Lima and Bogota
On a larger scale, Latin American cities are expanding rapidly and frequently faster than
population growth elsewhere in the country. The result has been the emergence of urban
areas of a large territorial size comprising multiple jurisdictions. Alongside territorial
and functional restructuring, metropolitan areas have faced political decentralization
aimed at producing new spaces for participation, reducing fiscal imbalance problems,
and organizing the local and territorial levels of the State in order to implement social
policies and deliver services efficiently. Despite these generalized trends, metropolitan
areas in each country have highly diverse features. This section presents background on
the institutional and territorial structures in the metropolitan areas of Mexico City, Lima
and Bogota.
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Source: Authors’ elaboration
Figure 3: Mexico City Metropolitan Area
4.1 Mexico City Metropolitan Area
Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA), one of the largest metropolitan areas in the
world, is the result of the explosive growth and expansion of the urban center during the
twentieth century. Due to the displacement of industrial activity and housing towards the
periphery, the city began its expansion into other jurisdictions outside its administrative
boundaries in the 1940s (Trejo 2013). At the time of the 2010 Population Census,
MCMA comprised over 20 million inhabitants, and had a land size of almost 8,000 square
kilometers and an average population density of 2,557 inhabitants per square kilometer
(SEDESOL et al. 2012). In 2013, MCMA accounted for 18% of the national population
and around 25% of total gross domestic product.
MCMA includes the administrative area of Mexico City1, formerly called the Federal
District, 59 adjacent municipalities in the State of Mexico, and a municipality in the state
of Hidalgo (Figure 3). Mexico City proper, itself composed of 16 boroughs, is the political
and economic seat of power. Prior to the approval of a political reform in 2015, it was
governed by special statute. In contrast to states, it did not have full autonomy, and until
1997 its head of government was not elected directly by the inhabitants, but appointed by
the President. Furthermore, the head of government had no constitutional or regulatory
capacity and boroughs had neither the autonomy nor all the functions of municipalities.
Metropolitan areas in Mexico do not have legal status as official jurisdictions, but the
constitution allows intermunicipal cooperation on a voluntary basis. Several governments
operate on different levels, leading to the evolution of different and frequently clashing
policies and rules. The administrative powers of 60 municipalities overlap with the
government of Mexico City, which in turn interacts with the powers of two different states,
Mexico and Hidalgo, as well as with the power of the central government (Figure 4).
Politico-administrative fragmentation, measured as the number of jurisdictions with more
than 100,000 inhabitants, indicates that 39 municipalities and boroughs have populations
of over that figure. This fragmentation decreases if we consider Mexico City proper as a
single local government (24 jurisdictions with populations of over 100,000 inhabitants).
Legal planning, coordination and political structures have not been conducive to
metropolitan-scale organization. Attempts at constructing effective metropolitan agree-
ments and commissions have been largely ineffective, due to the lack of financial, regulatory
and decision-making authority (Cenizal 2015)2. Thus MCMA entails a complex set of
1Mexico City proper.
2Article 115 in the Mexican Constitution allows for the coordination of states and municipalities to
address urban problems. Two or more municipalities and their respective states are also allowed to create
a conurbation commission. Article 122 allows cooperation between Mexico City and its neighboring
municipalities.
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Source: Authors’ elaboration
Figure 4: Government structure, Mexico City Metropolitan Area
governmental entities with overlapping federal, state, and local powers and an intricate
organizational structure that complicates metropolitan governance arrangements, in
particular planning schemes seeking to deliver services efficiently (Perlman et al. 2011).
4.2 Lima
The Metropolitan Area of Lima includes the provinces of Lima and Callao. In the province
of Lima, the metropolitan municipality assumes the functions of both regional government
and provincial municipality. In the province of Callao, regional and provincial government
are separate; this means that the Regional Government of Callao and the Provincial
Municipality of Callao exercise their respective functions over the same jurisdiction. The
province of Lima covers 49 districts governed by 48 district municipalities, whereas the
capital district is governed by the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima. In turn, the
Province of Callao has seven districts governed by six district municipalities, and the
capital district of Callao is governed by the Provincial Municipality of Callao (Figure
5). The population has grown rapidly since the mid-twentieth century. In 1940, Lima
and Callao had a population of 645,000 inhabitants; in 1972 this had risen to over three
million, and in 1993 it was over six million. In the 1970s the two provinces became a
conurbation (Figure 6). In 2013, the population was 9,752,000, of which one million were
in Callao (INEI 2014). A total of 25 of the 49 districts have a population of over 100,000.
Lima not only has special arrangements as a capital district; it also has been treated
differentially in the decentralization process. While other regional governments, including
the regional government of Callao, have taken on functions such as health and education,
the process has been discriminatory against the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima, where
central government remains the provider of various public services (Dia´logos de Pol´ıticas
Pu´blica 2015). The Organic Law of Municipalities allows the use of coordination mecha-
nisms between municipalities to ensure the efficient use of public resources. Municipalities
can create associations with other municipalities called mancomunidades. In order to
provide services and implement joint infrastructure projects, seven such associations
have been created. They have developed efforts to coordinate and provide services in
security and waste management3. However, mechanisms for coordination between the
municipalities of Lima and Callao have been weakly implemented.
3http://www.limacomovamos.org/boletines/las-7-mancomunidades-de-lima/#!prettyPhoto[inline]/-
0/
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Source: Authors’ elaboration
Figure 5: Government structure, Metropolitan Area of Lima
4.3 Bogota
According to the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE 2017) the
Metropolitan Area of Bogota includes Bogota District and the municipalities of Bo-
jaca´, Cajica´, Ch´ıa, Cogua, Cota, El Rosal, Facatat´ıva, Funza, Gachancipa´, La Calera,
Madrid, Mosquera, Nemoco´n, Soacha, Sibate´, Sopo´, Subachoque, Tabio, Tenjo, Tocancipa´
and Zipaco´n (Figure 7). It had a population of 7.8 million inhabitants in 2005 rising
to 9.3 million in 20154, making Bogota the largest metropolitan area in Colombia, one
of the largest in South America, and one of the 33 most-populated metropolises in the
world (Smith 2014). The Bogota District was the product of Decree 3640, approved in
1954, which annexed the surrounding municipalities of Engativa´, Fontibo´n, Suba, Usme,
Usaque´n and Bosa through the Seventh Ordinance of the Administrative Council of
Cundinamarca. The territory of Sumapaz was annexed in 1955. According to Article 199
of the 1986 political constitution, administration of the district is the responsibility of
the municipal council. Therefore, the city of Bogota is organized as a special district,
without subjection to the ordinary municipal regime, under the conditions fixed by the
law. With the approval of the Colombian political Constitution of 1991, Bogota became
a Capital District with special status. The new Constitution, which includes an Organic
Statute for Bogota, redefines the Capital District and eliminates the concept of annexed
municipalities to introduce the concept of localities.
The Organic Law of Territorial Ordering sets the principles of good governance in the
metropolitan area. This law recognizes that metropolitan areas are territorial associative
schemes and that the national government should promote metropolitan cooperation.
Article 15 allows associations between metropolitan areas. These can take place between
two or more metropolitan areas to jointly organize the provision of public services, the
implementation of regional projects, and the fulfillment of administrative functions. Such
projects may be developed through contracts, agreements or plans. There are also
municipal associative bodies, as in the case of Savannah Centro and Northern Savanna
and an agreement of cities in the periphery. Although the Bogota metropolitan area is
fragmented, unlike in Mexico City and Lima the dynamics of the metropolitan area are
strongly concentrated in Bogota District (Figure 8).
4For more information about the census in the metropolitan area: http://www.dane.gov.co/files/-
censo2005/resultados am municipios.pdf
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Source: Authors’ elaboration
Figure 6: Metropolitan Area of Lima
5 Metropolitan Governance of Public Services: An exploratory examination
In this section we analyze the governance structures in place in our three metropolitan
areas according to the explicit and implicit constituent elements of service supply. The
main findings regarding coordination, financial sustainability and coverage/quality are
discussed. Considering the issue of coordination contributes to understanding governance
organization, whereas looking at the financial aspects and coverage help to illustrate
efficiency and equity. The approach suggested by Parks, Oakerson (1993) and summarized
in Figure 1 is a useful guiding scheme to identify the different arrangements and levels of
metropolitan governance that operate in each service and metropolitan area: arrangements
for production (level 1), arrangements for provision (level 2) and the set of rules for
production and provision (level 3).
5.1 Waste collection
Each metropolitan area has a more or less complex governance organization and operation
depending on the diversity of actors involved in its regulation, management and production.
According to Article 115 of the Mexican Constitution, solid waste management is provided
by the municipalities. In Mexico City proper each borough must provide the service (level
2). Three schemes of production are: public; private; and public-private (level 1). In some
boroughs, participatory budgeting projects for local waste collection is a supplementary
formal mechanism for providing the service. In both the State of Mexico and Mexico
City proper there is a large informal sector (waste pickers, burreros -pickers that use
donkeys to transport waste- or carretoneros -pickers that transport waste by carts-) who
have historically had strong unions and powerful leaders. Some municipalities have a
Councilman (regidor) and in municipalities with greater organizational complexity there
is a Director of Public Services. Regarding level 3 of governance – where the rules for
provision and production arrangements for service delivery are made – the government
of the State of Mexico formulates waste management policy through the Ministry of
Environment. In Mexico City proper the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Works
and Services through its General Directorate of Urban Services, the Ministry of the
Environment and the Environmental Attorney of Land Management participate in urban
solid waste regulation and management.
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Source: DIRNI, recovered by Mayor of Bogota (2015)
Figure 7: Metropolitan area of Bogota according to DANE (2005 census)
In Lima, provincial municipalities are responsible for waste disposal whereas district
municipalities are in charge of the collection and transportation of solid waste. In the
capital districts of Lima and Callao, the provincial municipalities are responsible for the
collection and transport of solid waste (Durand 2012). Service provision operates under
a two-tier arrangement throughout fifty districts and two provinces (level 2). Cleaning
and waste collection are supplied directly by municipalities or by private companies
contracted to municipalities (level 1). Two large private companies, Petramas and Innova
Ambiental, provide the service for several municipalities. There are also municipalities
with mixed production schemes. Provincial municipalities regulate the disposal of solid,
liquid and industrial discharge. The Metropolitan Municipality of Lima has a special
legal regime with special functions in sanitation. It organizes the Metropolitan System of
Solid Waste Treatment and Disposal, signs concession contracts for waste management
services, and controls their operation. The district municipalities decide on areas for
landfill and waste accumulation (Organic Law of Municipalities Nr 27972). The Ministry
of Health’s General Directorate of Environmental Health controls landfill and authorizes
the work of companies that collect municipal waste. The Direction of Environmental
Quality formulates national policy on solid waste management; however, it conducts waste
management policy with limited normative prerogatives (level 3) (Durand 2012).
According to Law 142, normative control of the waste collection service in Colombia
is the responsibility of the National Regulatory Committee for Drinking Water and Basic
Sanitation, which regulates competition between service providers to avoid monopolies.
The National Superintendence of Domestic Utility Services controls and inspects the
efficiency of the service. There is a Municipal Special Administrative Unit of Public
Utilities which directs, controls and supervises the provision of road-cleaning services and
the collection and final placement of solid waste. The District Department of Environment
regulates and promotes environmental sustainability. Lastly, the municipal intercapital
consortium supervises the administrative, technical, operative, commercial, economic, and
financial aspects of solid waste management and collection (level 3) (Ciudad Limpia 2017).
The service is provided by Bogota Capital District and the rest of the municipalities (level
2). In recent years, Bogota’s solid waste service has been supplied by the Water Company.
There are also other companies involved, such as Ciudad Limpia, which deals with waste
in Bosa and Kennedy, and a number of recycling companies that collect, transport, and
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Source: Authors’ elaboration
Figure 8: Government structure, Metropolitan Area of Bogota
separate, where appropriate, solid waste. The city administration has implemented a new
sanitary scheme which assigns five areas of service to five private enterprises (level 1).
Coordination is weak or altogether lacking, depending on the city. In Bogota there
is no horizontal coordination between Soacha and Bogota, but service providers and
recyclers cooperate at the local level. In Lima, incipient horizontal coordination is sought
through the formation of associations of municipalities, but Callao is excluded. Provision
and production in MCMA lack mechanisms for coordination between boroughs and
municipalities.
In Bogota, operative costs are financed from fees that are subject to differentiation,
and provision is self-sustainable. Financial sustainability in this case is facilitated by one
specific characteristic of the administrative organization in Bogota which is stratification5.
Domiciliary public services operate under a cross-subsidy system, the so-called estratos.
This system provides an important administrative function by which the upper classes pay
higher rates for services or utilities, subsidizing the cost of services for the lower classes.
Half of the municipalities in metropolitan Lima have financial deficits due to low
payment rates and collected fees that do not cover expenditures, and provision has to be
financed by intergovernmental transfer.
In MCMA, unlike Bogota and Lima, there are no formal fares for this service. Instead,
citizens tip drivers and waste pickers who collect, sort and transport waste. Other than
labor costs, the operation is highly subsidized and is funded by local governments on a
shared-costs basis. Financial capacity is weak in general, and there is great variation in
between jurisdictions.
Official data show more than 90% service coverage in all three cities, yet these figures
often exclude informal settlements. In Bogota, for instance, official coverage is informed
by the stratification system, which omits informal housing. In Lima, the mean coverage
figure, 90% (MINAM 2014), hides the important variation across municipalities. In
MCMA coverage is usually based on Census registrations that are limited in including
informal housing. As in other cases peripheries tend to receive lower coverage and quality.
Similarly, in MCMA there are important spatial disparities, with lower coverage in the
northeast periphery, and there are significant problems of frequency and quality in the
service. Table B.1 in Appendix B summarizes the main findings on this service.
5This cross-subsidy system consists of six ‘estratos’ based on socio-economic criteria: Stratum 1
includes the lowest income population and stratum 6 the highest income population.
REGION : Volume 5, Number 3, 2018
60 A. B. Trejo Nieto, J. L. Nin˜o Amezquita, M. L. Vasquez
5.2 Water delivery
Providing an adequate water supply in metropolitan areas is technically and politically
very complex. Market and state failures have resulted in intricate arrangements for service
provision that involve four broad actors: public, informal, community-based, and private
operators that participate as part of public-private partnerships (Jones et al. 2014). In
MCMA the federal government is involved in water regulation through the National
Water Commission (CONAGUA), which is in charge of authorizing the use of national
water, the bulk supply of water, the construction and operation of the infrastructure, and
the preservation of aquifers. There is the Federal Basin Agency for the Valley of Mexico
(Aguas del Valle de Mexico) and the Water and Sewer Metropolitan Commission. Piped
water services must be provided by local governments. Municipalities decide whether to
manage and operate their water systems directly or through decentralized public bodies.
In Mexico City proper, SACMEX is the decentralized body responsible for providing
water to the sixteen boroughs. In addition, four private firms attend to some segments
of the water service across the boroughs6. In the states of Mexico and Hidalgo, 48% of
municipalities operate mixed provision schemes where the state, the municipality and
neighborhood committees overlap; 28% of municipalities have their own decentralized
company; 10% of municipalities have water services operated by community/neighborhood
bodies; and 14% of municipalities are direct producers. Informal mechanisms, the resale
of water and clandestine connections are the only sources of water available to residents
in several areas of the city (Rosales 2015).
In Metropolitan Lima, water is provided by Potable Water and Sewerage Service of
Lima (SEDAPAL), a public company operating under a private legal regime. SEDA-
PAL depends on the National Ministry of Housing and is regulated by the National
Superintendence of Sanitation Services (SUNASS), a public decentralized organization.
SUNASS, in turn, regulates and supervises water and sanitation provision and pricing.
The National Authority of Water (ANA) administers and monitors natural sources of
water and authorizes the volumes of water that service providers can take. According
to Law 28696, SEDAPAL provides water and sanitation services to Lima and Callao
provinces. Other areas can be included through a housing-sector Ministerial Resolution if
there is territorial continuity and the service can be technically provided by SEDAPAL.
Bogota’s Water Enterprise (Aguas de Bogota) provides services to Bogota and eleven
nearby towns. The company operates at a regional level as a private corporation. Aguas
de Bogota is subject to Law 142 and to all other norms that modify this law. The company
is regulated by the Commission for the Regulation of Drinking Water and Basic Sanitation
(CRA), which also sets the fares. Aguas de Bogota is the subsidiary company of a public
enterprise, Acueducto, which provides water and sewerage services. Acueducto’s service
model in Bogota is based on division of the metropolitan area into five zones. Acueducto
provides the service to the whole metropolitan area, not as a public but as a private firm.
Even though the Constitution allows voluntary cooperation, the supply of water
services in MCMA lacks intergovernmental, horizontal and institutional coordination.
Asymmetries in provision are significant because small municipalities are unable to benefit
from economies of scale or to internalize positive spillover effects. The provision of water
is a municipal function in Bogota, but the same company delivers the service to the whole
metropolitan area. This provision, however, is determined by the private legal status of
the producer rather than by formal horizontal coordination between Soacha and Bogota
DC. Likewise, in metropolitan Lima, horizontal coordination lacks relevance because
SEDAPAL is a central entity that supplies the whole metropolitan area (see Table B.2 in
the appendix).
In MCMA as a whole, tariffs cover only 64% of operating costs and the rest of the
cost has to be subsidized by the government. Only in Mexico City proper are subsidies
based on geographic location and depend on the socioeconomic characteristics of each
6Mexico City is divided into four zones receiving commercial and maintenance services. Zone A
includes three boroughs in the northwest and is served by SAPSA. Zone B comprises four boroughs and
is served by Industrias del Agua de la Ciudad de Me´xico. Zone C incorporates four boroughs which are
serviced by Tecnolog´ıa y Servicios del Agua. Zone D covers five boroughs and is provided by Agua de
Me´xico.
REGION : Volume 5, Number 3, 2018
A. B. Trejo Nieto, J. L. Nin˜o Amezquita, M. L. Vasquez 61
neighborhood. Payment rates are sufficient to maintain some financial stability. In
contrast, municipalities in the State of Mexico show significant heterogeneity depending
on the provision scheme and the capacity to collect tariffs. Small jurisdictions that do
not meet the requirements for establishing their own operator are the worst-off financially
because they lack access to specific public resources. As with other services, tariffs in
Bogota are determined according to the cross-subsidy system. Operational costs are
covered by fares and the company is considered financially healthy. The situation in Lima
is similar, with the operation financed by collected tariffs. There are some consumption
subsidies, and a transition to socioeconomic stratification is under way.
Official coverage data focuses on formal provision. The available data shows 100%
coverage in formal neighborhoods of Bogota DC and around 82% in Soacha. In Lima,
coverage is approximately 89%, with running water provided 24 hours a day in central
Lima and between 19 and 22 hours a day in the rest of the metropolitan area. The quality
of the service and the water itself accomplish minimum standards. In MCMA 79% of
the population live in houses with a piped water connection; however only 72% of the
population has daily access to water. In this metropolitan area daily access to water is
highly unevenly spatially distributed and most peripheral municipalities and boroughs
have extremely low availability. In these peripheries not only the service, but also the
water itself is poor quality. The service is severely affected by aging and poorly-maintained
pipes which can result in the loss of more than 25% of the water.
5.3 Public transport
In MCMA, public transportation is provided under varied government and concessional
supply schemes. Public transport consists of the following systems: subway (Metro), rapid
transit bus (Metrobus and Mexibus), light train, trolleybus, the Passenger Transport
Network (RTP), a suburban train (Suburbano), Eco-bici (a public bicycle-sharing system),
and private bus concessions (colectivos). According to the latest origin-destination survey
(INEGI 2007), approximately 50% of the 22 million daily journeys in the metropolis
are covered by buses and microbuses (as transport concessions), but Bus Rapid Transit
(BRT) systems that combine public and private participation, have experienced the largest
expansion in recent years. Some of these systems – subway, light train, trolleybus, the RTP
and Eco-bici – operate only or mostly in Mexico City proper. The governance of public
transport involves the following stakeholders: federal, state and local transport authorities,
private transport companies and, at least on paper, a transportation metropolitan
commission. In addition, there is a large informal sector. Despite the local nature of
the service, public transport is generally provided by intermediate level governments
(Ferna´ndez 2002). Intermediate level governments operating the public transport is the
prevailing situation in Mexican municipalities which, despite holding institutional powers
that allow them to intervene in the formulation and implementation of public passenger
transport programs, have delegated the task to state governments due to their lack of the
human, technical and financial resources needed to fully assume regulation and service
management (IMCO 2012). In Mexico City proper the local Ministry of Mobility is in
charge of planning and managing public transport. In the municipalities of the State of
Mexico, planning and regulation of public transport concessions is the responsibility of the
Ministry of Mobility, while the Ministry of Communications runs the mass-transit system,
Mexibus. In the state of Hidalgo regulation and planning is based on the Transport
Law and undertaken by a decentralized agency dependent on the Ministry of the interior
(OECD 2015). Some municipalities have a transport and transit agency that is responsible
for regulating local traffic and the building and maintenance of roads. The Metropolitan
Commission (COMETRAVI) was created in 1994 through an agreement signed by the
Federal Ministry of Transport and Communications and the governments of the State of
Mexico and Mexico City proper. However, COMETRAVI is a non-operating agency.
In Bogota, the BRT Transmilenio and local buses form the core of public transport
services and cover over 50% of journeys taken, with walking and motorcycles as significant
modes of transport in the peripheries. The Ministry of Transportation is in charge of
formulating and adopting policies, plans, programs and projects at the national level.
The Ministry of Mobility operates at the municipal level in Bogota and Soacha. These
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two local ministries are advised to work in coordination to solve mobility and transport
problems. The rest of the municipalities do not have such local ministries.
In Lima, provincial municipalities are in charge of regulating public transportation,
but in the 1990’s Peru adopted a public transportation model with little regulation and
dominated by private supply. Since 2010 a BRT line, COSAC, has connected the north
and the south of the city. A group of private companies run the COSAC service by means
of a concession. In 2012 the first metro line was inaugurated to connect the east with
the south, and a second line is under construction. The operation of metro lines is also
given as a concession to private companies. These two systems represent only 4.4% and
3.4% of journeys in the metropolis respectively (Survey, Lima Como Vamos, 2015). Most
metropolitan trips are taken on private bus lines that obtain authorization for specific
routes from the municipalities of Lima and Callao and “rent” these authorizations to bus
owners and drivers. This system is known as the commission-affiliation system. Since the
companies receive a payment per vehicle operating and not per passenger, there is an
excess of vehicles competing for passengers. There are 561 authorized routes with 38,000
vehicles in Lima and Callao (Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones 2016).
The different public transport alternatives in MCMA do not operate as an integrated
system. There is significant institutional and vertical as well as horizontal fragmentation.
Efforts to better integrate or coordinate transportation systems are limited to the integra-
tion of the subway, Metrobus and Ecobici payment systems, but these only cover Mexico
City proper. In the State of Mexico there is a predominance of ‘colectivos’. A suburban
train has operated between downtown Mexico City and some of the municipalities since
2008. The project was formulated and implemented mainly by the federal government,
with some State of Mexico and Mexico City government involvement.
In metropolitan Lima, an agreement was reached to allow Callao and Lima to grant
permits to private companies to operate across both provinces. However, lack of provincial
coordination has resulted in overlapping routes. Institutional coordination is also problem-
atic, and there are three different payment systems in the city. Metro and Metropolitano
do not operate in Callao.
In Bogota, the 2016–2020 Development Plan seeks to strengthen an integrated system
of public transportation including the collective public transportation and individual
public transportation services (Bogota 2015). The program is also pursuing improvements
to regional connectivity by inter-jurisdictional cooperation. However, the initiative has
remained limited, and for instance Transmilenio has only four stations in Soacha. There
is a consolidated model of infrastructure development, but this model is controlled by the
central government.
In the MCMA, the financial sustainability of government-operated transport systems is
precarious. They are heavily subsidized and their cost-revenue structures are not subject
to technical analysis, leading to significant inefficiency. Excessive subsidization has
contributed to local governments’ financial burden. ‘Colectivos’ face financial constraints
for investment, maintenance and operation. The system with the highest prices and in
the best financial situation is the suburban train, but it requires significant funding for
investment and maintenance. Bogota’s BRT system has been sustainable due to resources
injected by the district government, otherwise the tariffs would be insufficient to keep
it running. The intermunicipal buses are self-sustainable in the sense that they operate
on their own revenue. And in Lima, the Metropolitano system operates at costs while
the subway is subsidized by central government. The rest of the services are private and
self-sustained.
In MCMA official public transport coverage is above 90%, but peripheral areas exhibit
deficits which are often compensated for by informal supply. The same applies in Bogota
and Lima, whose official statistics do not reveal significant disparities. According to
interviewees’ perceptions, substantial inefficiencies, poor quality, low capacity, poor safety,
low frequency and high prices are critical problems that require attention in all three of
the metropolises.
Overall, services in MCMA are the most fragmented and have the lowest performance
in terms of efficiency and equity. Public transportation is the service with the weakest
governance and poorest performance in the three metropolises.
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Table 1: Classification of service provision schemes
MA Bogota MA Lima MA Mexico
City
Piped water In consolidation Consolidated Fragmented
Waste recollection In consolidation In consolidation Fragmented
Public transport In consolidation Fragmented Fragmented
Source: Authors’ elaboration
5.4 The models of service provision
Despite the established structures of government, intergovernmental relations and decen-
tralization processes, metropolitan governance structures differ not only across metropolises,
but also across sectors within the same metropolis. Arrangements for service provision and
production and the related legal structures and rules vary depending on the local context
and the service to be provided. The multiple forms of organization for the provision
of services illustrate the diversity of governance structures and their evolution. We use
the concept of consolidation to classify different governance schemes. Consolidation is
understood here as a condition in which the supply area of a service is metropolis-wide.
Metropolis-wide supply areas can be achieved by means of production arrangements or by
annexation. Metropolitan governance can be classified into three categories: i) fragmented,
where provision and production organization preserve the administrative structure of
the metropolitan area, and there are no coordination arrangements or other formal or
informal efforts to deliver metropolitan wide services; ii) consolidated, where a service is
provided and produced completely or mostly by one entity; and iii) in consolidation, where
different schemes, public or private, formal or informal, are aimed to build a metropolitan
approach for service supply, with metropolitan zones gradually incorporated into the
service supply area. See Table 1 for a summary.
The three services in the Metropolitan area of Bogota are classified as in consolidation.
Transmilenio provides public transportation services in part of Soacha, and the Water
Enterprise of Bogota also increasingly provides services outside the capital district. The
consolidation of metropolitan area-wide service supply is explained to a good extent by
the fact that the main political jurisdiction contains more than 80% of the population
and covers most of the urban area. Actually, the metropolitan area as such has been
in consolidation due to the historic process of annexation of surrounding municipalities.
New areas beyond Bogota DC have been incorporated into the capital district and to
the service delivery area over time. However, Soacha remains outside Bogota DC even
though it is a rapidly-growing territory in demographic terms and has strong functional
relations with Bogota.
In Lima, the water service is consolidated because the public company SEDAPAL
provides water to the whole metropolitan area. Waste collection services are in consolida-
tion with intermunicipal agreements seeking to coordinate and cooperate to deliver the
service by means of associations of municipalities. However, so far, such initiatives have
made slow progress. The transport service is fragmented. However, in the near future
proposals may arise, since the subway service is expected to cover the province of Callao.
In Mexico City, piped water, waste collection and public transportation services
are fragmented because they are mainly provided by multiple local governments and
organizations with almost a complete lack of arrangements for metropolitan cooperation
and coordination.
We find that the three models have implications for coordination, financial sus-
tainability and coverage. Inter-jurisdictional coordination and cooperation and central
government schemes are not observed in fragmented services. Services in consolidation
relate to diverse arrangements for integrating or expanding the service area. Consolidation
has depended mostly on national government initiatives and structures, although some
form of cooperation or coordination may be necessary at lower levels. Fragmentation
entails greater financial difficulties, especially when small governments and municipalities
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with low financial and fiscal capacity are unable to achieve economies of scale or their
administrative structures lack the necessary resources. The more consolidated a service
governance structure is, the better its financial capacities appear to be. Generally, the
greatest difficulties in all cities and sectors are related to expenditure on infrastructure
and investment. Consolidation contributes to better coverage and quality, and also to
more equal access to services.
6 Final Remarks
This study has responded to the relative gap in understanding the specific empirical
experiences of metropolitan governance of the delivery of public services in Latin America.
Given that jurisdictional fragmentation is an inherent characteristic of metropolitan areas,
distinguishing between provision and production/supply has helped us to identify varia-
tions across services and cities. In this comparative analysis of metropolitan governance in
Mexico City, Bogota and Lima we have found not only that governance structures differ,
but also that in some instances service supply is adapted to accommodate specific needs
and sociopolitical contexts, even if such arrangements do not necessarily correspond to
local rationalities. Such is the case of water provision in Lima, where the service is supplied
by a public company that depends on the national government. In the metropolitan
area of Bogota, institutional arrangements have been modified to gradually expand the
supply of transport services to areas beyond the capital district as far as the municipality
of Soacha. Although this has been a slow and problematic process, Transmilenio has
established a few stations in Soacha. Another example is the water company in Bogota,
which supplies the capital district as a public service and supplies other municipalities as
a private company via arrangements with local governments. Also in Lima, some effort
has been made towards intermunicipal coordination in the waste-management sector by
means of associations of municipalities.
Even though the water service in Lima is the most consolidated governance structure
discussed here, water services are provided by an agency which depends on the national
government. Locally-guided projects or initiatives are weaker. Secondly, the consolidation
processes in Bogota are strongly related to the historic annexation of territories to the
main city. Third, the relatively good financial performance in service provision in Bogota is
due to the cross-subsidy system. Fourth, despite the absence of metropolitan governments,
governance can solve problems. The quality of that governance in turn affects technical,
financial and social outcomes and performance. These cases exemplify how service supply
with a metropolitan approach is not necessarily a process in which fragmented areas are
governed by a single entity that provides all services to the wider territory, but can be a
slow process of consolidation led by various arrangements and actors across sectors and
jurisdictions.
On the other hand, the metropolitan area of Mexico City is a case in which coordination,
financial sustainability and equity in every public service is strongly affected by high
fragmentation which overpowers any approach to interjurisdictional coordination and
cooperation for economic and social efficiency. Despite constitutional autonomy for
voluntary intermunicipal cooperation, there are very few instances of coordination. It is
not possible to conclude, however, that the lack of coordination and poor governance derive
purely from the administrative fragmentation of the territory. In this specific metropolitan
area, political economic factors appear to play a determining role in explaining the weak
metropolitan governance structures including party and political competition between
states and between municipalities; three-year municipal government terms; a culture of
all-embracing political power and others.
We argue that fragmentation creates substantial difficulties in providing urban services.
Yet empirically, governance for service provision is place-specific and depends on local
political culture and overarching state legal frameworks. In the absence of formal
metropolitan government, the operating structures of governance can reverse the negative
impact of fragmentation. Lastly, metropolitan structures can vary to accommodate the
characteristics of the services provided.
While these findings are not generalizable, they illustrate the significant empirical
REGION : Volume 5, Number 3, 2018
A. B. Trejo Nieto, J. L. Nin˜o Amezquita, M. L. Vasquez 65
variation to be found across metropolises and sectors. They also illustrate the need, in
less developed countries, for a debate on metropolitan governance that goes beyond the
traditional approach to jurisdictional fragmentation and metropolitan governments. These
findings can be used as a basis from which to identify questions for future comparative
research or further in-depth case studies either by sector or by metropolitan area. Future
work in our research will include in-depth analysis by sector to deal with questions
that include the historical evolution of metropolitan configurations; the way politics
have shaped metropolitan bureaucracy and government; how civil participation and
transparency are embedded in metropolitan governance organization; and private actors’
role in the production of services.
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A Appendix: Fieldwork
Guiding questions (focus groups and interviews)
1. What is the role or what place does the service occupy in the metropolitan/urban
agenda?
2. What is the general diagnosis (depending on the case) of the main problems faced
by the provision of (water provision, waste recollection and public transport) at the
metropolitan level and in the metropolitan periphery in particular?
3. In terms of coverage, to what extent can we speak of an accessible and universal
service?
4. What is the assessment of the frequency and quality of the service?
5. What is the appreciation of the characteristics and the physical support of the
service?
6. Are there infrastructural or operational deficiencies?
7. To what extent do authorities worry about improving the provision of the service?
8. What are the perspectives, limits and opportunities for the expansion of the service
to reach metropolitan coverage?
9. What are the possibilities for an Integrated Metropolitan Service System?
10. What are the challenges for local governments in providing te service?
11. What are the general characteristics of the tariff system and the cost of provision?
12. What is the general evaluation of the financial sustainability in the provision of the
service?
13. What is the evaluation of the current institutional and operational coordination
between different jurisdictions and levels of government?
14. What efforts are developing at different tiers of government to improve the service?
15. What is the role of political factors in the operation and provision of the service?
Technical visits
Ecatepec (Mexico City)
Melchor Ocampo (Mexico City)
Puente Piedra (Lima)
Soacha (Bogota)
Ciudad Bolivar (Bogota)
Interviews
1. Bogota
Municipality of Soacha (director of public services)
Community leader (Ciudad Bolivar)
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2. Lima
Municipality of Puente Piedra (manager of urban development)
Autoridad Auto´noma del Sistema Ele´ctrico de Transporte Masivo de Lima y Callao –
AATE (agengy in charge of the Metro Project in Lima and Callao)
Transport office, Municipalidad de Lima
SEDAPAL (public company of water and sanitation)
3. Mexico City Metropolitan Area
Ecatepec (They had accepted the meeting, but refuse to answer the questions)
Melchor Ocampo Municipality (Mayor)
Melchor Ocampo (director of urban services)
Melchor Ocampo (director of water provision)
Melchor Ocampo (coordinator or public transport)
Consultant of Ferrocarriles Suburbanos (Suburban train)
B Appendix: Summary of findings
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